This paper provides a critique of the 'unemployment invariance hypothesis', according to which the behavior of the labor market, by itself, ensures that the long-run unemployment rate is independent of the size of the capital stock, productivity and the labor force. In the context of an endogenous growth model, we show that the labor market alone need not contain all the equilibrating mechanisms to ensure unemployment invariance; in particular, other markets may perform part of the equilibrating process as well. By implication, policies that raise the growth path of capital or increase the effective working-age population may influence the long-run unemployment rate.
INTRODUCTION
Is long-run unemployment affected by policies that raise the capital stock (all other things equal, including the rate of capital accumulation)? Would the long-run unemployment rate be influenced by a rise in the effective workingage population (induced, say, by early retirement measures or constraints on working time), or an increase in productivity (generated, for example, by policies promoting R&D), other things being equal? Questions of this sort have been central to the policy debate concerning unemployment over the past few decades.
The mainstream answer to these questions in the macro labor economics literature has been dominated by the need to explain why unemployment rates in the OECD are trendless in the long run (e.g. over the past century), despite growth in the capital stock, total factor productivity and the labor force. Productivity growth stimulated labor demand; population growth stimulated labor supply. But these developments have not proceeded at the same rate. For most OECD countries, the rate of productivity growth over the past century has far exceeded the rate of population growth, but nevertheless the unemployment rates have not followed a declining trend over the long run. 1 The way in which the mainstream literature has captured this phenomenon is through what may be called the 'unemployment invariance hypothesis', which asserts that the behavior of the labor market, by itself, ensures that the long-run unemployment rate is independent of the size of the capital stock, total factor productivity and the labor force. This hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 1 , which pictures an aggregate labor demand curve (LD, specifying aggregate employment at any given real wage), a wage-setting curve (WS, specifying the equilibrium real wage at any given aggregate employment level), 2 and a labor supply curve (LS, specifying the size of the labor force at any given real wage, depicted for simplicity by a vertical line). The intersection of the labor demand curve LD 1 and the wage-setting curve WS 1 yields the initial equilibrium employment level (E* 1 ) and the equilibrium real wage (w* 1 ). The difference between the labor supply (LS) and employment at the equilibrium real wage (w* 1 ) is the equilibrium unemployment level (U* ). Now suppose that the labor demand curve shifts outwards to LD 2 , due to capital accumulation or technological advance. Then, according to the Figure 1 The unemployment invariance hypothesis 1. Moreover, the major swings in labor force growth, in response to baby booms and troughs, have not been closely related to the major swings in productivity growth. However, there is no evidence of any trends in unemployment related to these developments. 2. If the labor market clears, the wage-setting curve coincides with the labor supply curve. If it does not clear -for efficiency wage, insider-outsider, labor union or other reasons -then the wage-setting curve lies to the left of the labor supply curve, as illustrated in the figure.
unemployment invariance hypothesis, the wage-setting and/or labor supply curves must shift in the long run so that the unemployment rate remains unchanged. The standard way of achieving this result is to specify wagesetting behavior so as to ensure that the wage-setting curve shifts inwards by the same amount as the labor demand curve shifts out -i.e. to WS 2 -so that equilibrium unemployment (and unemployment rate) are the same. Similarly, if the labor supply curve LS shifts outwards due to population growth, the wage-setting curve may shift outward in the long run, once again leaving the unemployment rate unchanged.
The literature contains two influential forms of the unemployment invariance hypothesis. The 'strong invariance' hypothesis (e.g. Layard et al., 1991) asserts that any exogenous permanent shock in the capital stock, total factor productivity or the labor supply leads to counterveiling shifts in the labor demand, wage-setting and labor supply curves so as to restore the unemployment rate to its original long-run equilibrium. By implication, policies that stimulate capital accumulation or R&D or policies that reduce the size of the labor force (ceteris paribus) can have no effect on the long-run unemployment rate.
The 'weak invariance' hypothesis (e.g. Phelps, 1994, Ch. 17; Fitoussi et al., 2000) asserts that the long-run unemployment rate can be influenced by the capital stock, productivity and the labor force only in trendless combinations. For instance, given that the ratio of capital to labor (in efficiency units) is trendless, then the long-run unemployment rate may depend on this ratio. This weak invariance hypothesis is also supported by Rowthorn (1999) . He argues that the capital stock does not affect the long-run unemployment rate in the Layard-Nickell-Jackman model only because this model assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function, so that the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is unity. If, more realistically, this elasticity is taken to be less than unity, then weak invariance follows. 3 It is common practice, in empirical modeling of the aggregate labor market, to impose restrictions on the labor demand, wage-setting and labor supply curves that make the unemployment invariance hypothesis (in its strong or weak form) hold. 4 These restrictions generally play a crucially important role in conditioning the behavior of these models. The empirical illustration we provide in Section 5 shows that they are rejected by the data. In addition, Phelps (1994) estimates a reduced-form unemployment equation which includes capital stock as an explanatory variable. 5 Arestis and Mariscal (2000) , using quarterly data for the UK and Germany, establish significant effects of capital stock on unemployment and conclude that investmentenhancing policies could have a permanent effect on unemployment in both countries. In short, these restrictions are an instance of theory overriding empirical considerations. This paper calls the unemployment invariance hypothesis into question. In particular, we argue that the weak and strong forms of this hypothesis, applied to labor market activity, are not necessary to explain the long-run trendlessness of unemployment. The reason is that both forms of the hypothesis imply the long-run unemployment trendlessness is due entirely to equilibrating mechanisms in the labor market. By contrast, we show that the labor market need not, all by itself, ensure such trendlessness. Instead, what is required is merely that all the markets in the economy, interacting with one another, generate such equilibrating mechanisms.
In short, the labor market may be only one of various markets doing the required equilibration to generate trendlessness of unemployment over the long run. The fact that the unemployment invariance restrictions are usually rejected by the data suggests that this is indeed generally the case.
It may be tempting to believe that when all markets in the economy are involved in the equilibration process that ensures long-run unemployment trendlessness, then unemployment invariance restrictions (strong or weak) must be imposed on the long-run behavior of the entire general equilibrium system. After all, the steady state of this general equilibrium system must have the property that the unemployment rate is trendless and that the ratio of capital to labor (in efficiency units) is trendless as well. However, it turns out, as we will show in Section 3, that the invariance restrictions are not necessary in this context either. While it is true that some restrictions do need to be imposed on the general equilibrium system to guarantee that the unemployment is trendless in the long run, these restrictions are much weaker than even weak unemployment invariance.
Section 2 examines the invariance restrictions in the context of the basic model of Layard et al. (1991) . In Section 3 we present another simple model that highlights why unemployment invariance is an important issue for understanding and predicting labor market activity, as well as formulating policy. Section 4 extends this model and shows how long-run unemployment trendlessness arises not from labor market activity alone, but in conjunction with the activity in other markets. Section 5 provides an empirical illustration, comprising a model of the UK labor market, where we test for strong and weak invariance. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
UNEMPLOYMENT INVARIANCE RESTRICTIONS
In much of the existing literature, the unemployment invariance restrictions are specified in terms of the Layard-Nickell-Jackman (LNJ) model. To set the stage, we now proceed to specify the restrictions in terms of this model. The central LNJ model (specified in LNJ, 1991, Ch. 8, and summarized on p. 368) consists of a price mark-up equation and a wage mark-up equation.
These equations are meant to describe equilibrium unemployment as the outcome of the 'battle of the mark-ups'.
First, prices are set as a mark-up on wages:
where P t is the price level, W t is the wage level, u t is the unemployment rate, K t is the capital stock, L t is the labor force, and the coefficients b i (i40) are all positive. Following the standard set-up, all variables (except the unemployment rate) are in logs. Second, wages are set as a mark-up on prices:
where the coefficients g i (i40) are all positive. Thus, by (1) and (2), the equilibrium unemployment rate is
In this context, the 'strong invariance restrictions' -ensuring that the unemployment rate is independent of the capital stock and the labor force in the long run -are:
In fact, LNJ ( p. 368) impose the restrictions b 2 5 b 3 5 g 2 5 g 3 , which are even more restrictive than the strong invariance restrictions (4). Suppose that the capital-labor ratio (K t -L t ) is trendless. Then the 'weak invariance restriction' may be specified as
(Then, clearly, the equilibrium unemployment rate depends on the capitallabor ratio, but not on the individual magnitudes of capital and labor.)
WHY UNEMPLOYMENT INVARIANCE MATTERS
To see why the unemployment invariance hypothesis matters, let us consider another simple model of the labor market, corresponding to the one underlying 
A model
Let the labor demand equation be
describing firms' aggregate labor demand. E is employment, w is the real wage, K is the capital stock, and Z is the working-age population, and all coefficients are positive. 6 This equation represents the only substantial contrast between this model and the previous one. The first difference is that equation (6) describes the employment level, whereas the LNJ P-W mark-up equation is in terms of the employment rate (employment as a fraction of the labor force). In particular, the LNJ P-W mark-up equation can be expressed as the following labor demand equation:
where E t À L t is the employment rate. However, equation (6) is more plausible:
given that labor demand is the outcome of profit maximization subject to a production function, we expect the employment level -rather than the employment rate -to depend on the real wage and the capital-labor ratio.
The second difference is that equation (6) contains employment inertia (via the term a E E t À 1 ). The LNJ model (1991, Ch. 8) introduces dynamics via the wage equation; in particular, the dynamic version of the LNJ W-P markup equation is W t À P t 5 g 0 À g 1 u t þ g 2 K t À g 3 L t À g 4 Du t . As we will show below, this form of dynamics has markedly different implications from the employment inertia in (6).
Let the wage-setting equation be
describing the outcome of a wage-bargaining process. 7 (The differences between this wage-setting equation and the one given in the section above are not matters of substance.) The labor force is
where L is labor supply. All variables (except the unemployment rate, below) are in logs. The unemployment rate is 8
6. Current employment depends positively on lagged employment due to employment adjustment costs, inversely on the real wage due to diminishing returns to labor, positively on the capital stock due to capital-labor complementarities, and positively on population since more jobseekers reduce search costs. 7. The real wage depends positively on the capital stock because the latter stimulates productivity (thereby increasing the firms' surplus in bargaining) and has an income effect on households (thereby reducing the workers' surplus in bargaining). 8. This is an approximation.
Substituting equation (7) into (6), we obtain the following employment equation:
where
This equation may be rewritten as follows:
Substituting the employment equation (11) and the labor supply equation (8) into (9), and letting employment rate in the steady state grow at the constant rate g E , we obtain the following steady-state unemployment rate: 9
where the steady-state employment growth rate is 10
and g K , g Z are the steady-state values of the capital stock growth rate (DK t ) and population growth rate (DZ t ), respectively. The term (a E /[1 À a E ])g E in the unemployment equation (12) represents 'frictional growth', i.e. the interaction between employment growth and lagged employment adjustment. Since employment growth is positive and employment adjustment is characterized by inertia (given by the inertia coefficient a E ), employment is 'chasing after a moving target', i.e. after the frictionless employment level. The greater is employment growth and the 9. Note that unemployment rate is given by
We assume that the growth rate of employment (DE t ) stabilizes to the constant g E in the steady state. For the various reasons to be given below, steady-state unemployment u LR is trendless (lacks a time subscript) even though the population Z t and the capital stock K t grow through time. 10. To see this take the first difference of equation (10):
In the steady state we assume that all growth rates stabilize to some constants, i.e
Hence, we obtain equation (13).
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r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004 greater the inertia coefficient a E , the further behind its target does actual employment fall, and thus the higher is unemployment. Thus observe that the effect of employment inertia does not ever die out in this model; its interaction with employment growth affects the long-run unemployment rate, and it also influences the way this unemployment rate depends on the capital stock and the labor force. Note that the phenomenon of frictional growth cannot be captured in the LNJ model above, since that model is specified solely in terms of stationary variables (the capital-labor ratio and the unemployment rate are assumed stationary in the long run), and thus the interaction between growth and labor market frictions does not occur.
In the context of our model, the strong invariance conditions are
This implies that the steady-state unemployment rate (12) becomes
i.e. the equilibrium of the labor market ensures that variations in population Z t and the capital stock K t have no influence on the steady-state unemployment rate.
Suppose that the capital-population ratio (K t À Z t ) is trendless. Then the weak invariance condition is
Thus the steady-state unemployment rate (12) becomes
Þþ a E 1 À a E g E À a 0 1 À a E and since (K t À Z t ) is trendless by assumption, the steady-state unemployment rate is trendless as well.
In the absence of strong or weak invariance, the following condition is required to ensure that the unemployment rate is trendless in the long run: 11
11. This condition can be derived by taking the first difference of equation (12):
and setting Du LR t ¼ 0 (i.e. the unemployment rate stabilizes to some constant in the steady state).
Here the equilibration mechanism, ensuring the trendlessness of steady-state unemployment, lies (in part) 12 outside the labor market. To fix ideas, let us assume that the population growth rate g Z is exogenously given and that the capital stock adjusts so as to achieve a steady state in which capital accumulation g K is constant and satisfies (16) . (The Solow model provides an example of how the capital stock adjusts to achieve the steady state, given an exogenous rate of population growth.)
Two policy exercises
In the context of this model, we now proceed to show why the unemployment invariance conditions matter by examining two comparative dynamic exercises. First, consider the response of (steady-state) unemployment to a policy that generates an upward shift of the path of the capital stock. Specifically, the capital stock increases by dK t ¼ K 0 t À K t in each period but its growth rate remains unchanged. The implications of this policy for unemployment are as follows:
Under strong invariance, there is no effect on the unemployment (by (14)). Under weak invariance, the steady-state unemployment rate falls by (a Z / [1 À a E ] À c Z )dK t . In the absence of strong or weak invariance, the steady-state unemployment rate falls by (a
In our second comparative dynamic exercise, consider the steady-state unemployment effect of a policy that increases labor force participation (e.g. job counselling, wage subsidies, payroll tax reductions). Specifically, the policy raises the coefficient a Z in the employment equation.
Under strong invariance, the increase in a Z (denoted by da Z ) is matched by an increase in c Z , namely dc Z 5 (1/[1 À a E ])da Z , and thus the only influence on the steady-state unemployment rate is through the employment growth rate term in (12): du LR t ¼ fa E g Z =½ð1 À a E Þ 2 g=da Z . This influence is negligible for small population growth rates. Under weak invariance, the effect is the same as above, since c Z À (a Z / [1 À a E ]) 5 a K (by equation (15)) and the coefficient a K remains unchanged. In the absence of strong or weak invariance, the growth rate of capital stock needs to adjust so that unemployment stabilizes (by equation (16)). Thus the steady-state unemployment rate changes by 13
12. Of course some of the equilibration also occurs in the labor market, since employment responds to the capital stock and working-age population. 13. Comparing the two steady states, note that dK t adjusts to Z t so that the right-hand side of equation (17) is a constant. The underlying computations are given in Appendix B. These examples show clearly how important the unemployment invariance conditions are for the predictions and policy implications of the model.
GROWTH, UNEMPLOYMENT TRENDLESSNESS AND UNEMPLOYMENT INVARIANCE
We now extend the model above to an endogenous growth context and show that neither the weak nor strong forms of the unemployment invariance hypothesis, applied to the labor market, are necessary to ensure the long-run trendlessness of unemployment.
A model
Our model is in the spirit of Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) , and Aghion and Howitt (1992) , but we develop it as an extension of the models above.
In the Solow growth model, goods can be used for two purposes: consumption and investment. We now assume that they can serve a third purpose as well: R&D. For analytical simplicity (but without loss of generality), 14 assume that R&D is produced through labor alone. Let E t t be the amount of labor in the R&D sector, whose output is the rate of technological progress Dt t . Let the production function of the R&D sector be
The more labor is devoted to R&D, the less is available for the production of consumption and investment goods and the faster the rate of technological progress. As in the models above, let E t be the amount of labor devoted to consumption and investment goods. Then the unemployment rate becomes
Now let the price mark-up over the wage be
where t t is a technological variable (and Dt t is technological change); and let the wage mark-up over the price be
14. It is straightforward to extend the model to let R&D be generated by both labor and capital.
Then, by (20), (21) and (19), the labor market equilibrium condition now becomes
Next, consider the capital goods market. Let V t be the nominal user cost of capital. Let the price mark-up over the user cost depend positively on the capital stock K t (due to diminishing returns to capital), negatively on employment E t (since a rise in employment is assumed to increase the productivity of capital, permitting the firm to reduce its price relative to the user cost), and negatively on the technological variable t t (since a rise in t t also raises the productivity of capital):
where the parameters a 0 , a K , a E and a t are positive. Furthermore, let the user cost mark-up over the price depend negatively on the capital stock K t (since an increase in capital stock reduces the cost of producing new capital goods, i.e. investment), and positively on employment E t and the technological variable t t (since an increase in E t and t t raise productivity and enable firms to demand a higher user cost):
where d 0 , d I , d K , d E , d t 40.
By equations (23), (24) and (19), the capital goods market equilibrium condition becomes
We may rewrite the labor market equilibrium and capital goods market equilibrium conditions as
where 
Invariance conditions
By equation (26), the strong invariance restrictions, applied to the labor market, may be expressed as follows:
The weak invariance restrictions, applied to the labor market, ensure that the behavior of the labor market is such that the ratio of capital to labor in efficiency unitsK K t =L L tt t t À Á is constant. 15 For our model, these restrictions are:
Beyond that, there is one further set of invariance restrictions encountered in the literature, namely, weak invariance applied to the general equilibrium system (rather than just to the labor market). These restrictions on the parameters ensure that the behavior of the general equilibrium system is such that the ratio of capital to labor in efficiency unitsK K t =L L tt t t À Á is constant. This property -which may be called 'weak general equilibrium invariance' -is present, for example, in Rowthorn (1999, p. 412, equation (20) ). In the Rowthorn model, the constancy of the long-run unemployment rate requires the constancy of the long-run ratio of capital to labor in efficiency units.
Balanced growth in the absence of the invariance restrictions
We now return to our model and suppose that the equilibration process, ensuring balanced growth with a trendless unemployment rate, occurs not only in the labor market but also through adjustments in capital accumulation and R&D, as is standard in a variety of endogenous growth models. In particular, capital accumulation and R&D adjust so that the economy approaches a steady state in which (a) the labor market and the capital goods market are both in equilibrium, (b) the capital stock grows at a constant rate, (c) the rate of technological progress is constant and (d) the unemployment rate is constant.
Furthermore, taking first differences of equations (26) and (27), and recalling that the unemployment rate is constant in the long run, we obtain the long-run equilibrium growth rates of the capital stock (g K ) and technological progress (g t ) as a function of the growth rate of labor force (g L ): 16
15. The tilde (' $ ') above the variable denotes its level. 16. In the long run, the first differencing of the market equilibrium conditions (26) and (27) gives:
Du * ¼ a L g L þ a K g K À a t g t ¼ 0
respectively. Solving these equations, for a given growth rate of the labor force (g L ), we obtain (30) and (31).
These conditions ensure that unemployment is trendless.
Equations (30) and (31) imply the following relationships between the levels of capital stockK K t À Á , technological progresst t t ð Þ and labor forceL L t À Á : 17
respectively; and where
and A, C are arbitrary constants.
Manipulation of the above equations shows that the capital-labor ratio in efficiency units is not constant over time:
Observe that this condition is of course weaker than even weak general equilibrium invariance. Recall that under general equilibrium invariance, the ratio of capital to labor in efficiency units ðK K t =L L tt t t Þ is constant. This special case holds only under the additional restriction that a 5 1 þ b. However, as shown, this condition is not required to ensure unemployment trendlessness and balanced growth.
Dw t ¼ À0:34 ð0:11Þ À 0:31 ð0:07Þ w tÀ2 þ 0:16 ð0:04Þ b t À 1:18 ð0:34Þ DTR t À 0:50 ð0:14Þ u t ð36Þ DL t ¼ À0:004 ð0:02Þ þ 0:41 ð0:12Þ DL tÀ1 À 0:25 ð0:07Þ L tÀ2 À 0:16 ð0:07Þ Du t þ 0:02 ð0:01Þ
where D is the difference operator, standard errors are in parentheses 19 and the definitions of the variables are given below:
w t ¼ log of real compensation per person employed;
K t ¼ log of real capital stock; p oil t ¼ log of real oil price;
b t ¼ log of real social security benefits per person;
TR t ¼ indirect taxes as % of GDP; Z t ¼ log of working-age population:
Note that the above estimated equations were selected on the basis of the Akaike information criterion or the Schwarz Bayesian criterion, and consist of stationary, well-specified linear combinations of the variables involved. 20 Figure 2 shows that our estimated model tracks the data very well.
For expositional purposes, we rewrite the labor market system (35)-(37) as
19. The ð * Þ in equation (37) indicates that we have restricted the long-run elasticity of population to unity. This can be justified as follows. The unrestricted version of equation (37) DL t ¼ À0:50 ð1:08Þ þ 0:40 ð0:12Þ DL tÀ1 À 0:26 ð0:07Þ L tÀ2 þ 0:29 ð0:10Þ Z t À 0:16 ð0:07Þ Du t þ 0:01 ð0:01Þ w t
shows that the coefficient of Z t is (i) statistically significant at any conventional level, and (ii) very close in magnitude, and with opposite sign, to the parameter of L tÀ2 . These observations led us to impose the restriction that the long-run elasticity of population is unity which could not be rejected at any conventional size of the test. 20. In addition to the standard misspecification tests (linearity, no serial correlation, homoskedasticity and normality), all equations pass the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests for structural stability. (The least squares estimation and the diagnostic tests are given in Appendix A.) Our preferred specifications (35)-(37) have been estimated using 3SLS in order to take into account potential endogeneity and cross-equation correlation.
where all the b's are positive. Using equations (38)-(40) together with the definition of the unemployment rate, u t 5 L t À E t , Henry et al. (2000) derive the 'reduced-form' unemployment rate equation and its long-run solution 21 u LR t À Á :
Testing the strong invariance restrictions
According to the strong restrictions, the long-run unemployment rate should not depend on growing variables like capital stock (K t ) and working-age population (Z t ). Therefore, in the context of equation (41), we can express the strong invariance restrictions as follows: 
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The reasoning is straightforward. Our unemployment rate equation (41) is derived by subtracting (the long-run solution of ) labor demand from labor supply (having first substituted out in these equations the wage-setting function). Therefore, when labor demand does not depend on capital stock (b 4 5 0) the unemployment rate will not depend on capital stock either and the strong invariance condition will be valid. On the other hand, if b 16 5 0 then the labor supply equation (40) is not dynamically stable. 22 In this case we cannot even derive a reduced-form unemployment rate equation, let alone testing any restrictions. A similar situation arises when the wage-setting equation (39) is not dynamically stable, i.e. b 10 5 0, or when the labor demand equation (38) is not stable (b 2 5 0). However, we should make clear that the above reasoning does not imply that individual testing is the same as joint testing of the parameters. 23 We only argue that the hypothesis H K (H Z ) can be substantiated if any of the individual hypotheses in H 0 K H 0 Z À Á cannot be rejected. It is not difficult to see that our estimations reject the above hypotheses, since all the coefficients of the labor market system (35)-(37) are statistically different from zero at any conventional significance level.
We can also test the strong invariance restrictions in the standard integration-cointegration framework as opposed to the ARDL technique followed by Henry et al. (2000) . Consider the following error correction form of the autoregressive distributed lag equations (38)-(40):
22. Note that dynamic stability of an equation implies that the variables involved are cointegrated. 23. Generally, individual and joint testing will yield different results due to the non-zero covariances between the parameters.
respectively. Therefore, the long-run solutions of (38)- (40),
should represent cointegrating vectors. Now recall that the strong invariance restrictions require that either b 10 5 0, or b 16 5 0, or b 2 5 b 4 5 0. Therefore, non-cointegration of the variables in any of the three vectors (45)-(47) would provide evidence for the validity of the strong invariance restrictions. However, when we test for cointegration using the Johansen procedure, we cannot reject the hypotheses that the above linear combinations of variables are stationary. 24 In other words, the results obtained from the Johansen procedure validate our conclusion from the ARDL approach that the strong invariance restrictions are rejected. 24 . In particular, the evidence from the Johansen procedure is that the variables involved in each of the equations (45)-(47) are cointegrated. For example, using the maximal eigenvalue and trace statistics of the Johansen procedure, we find that there is a cointegrating vector among the variables involved in the labor demand equation: E t , w t , K t , TR t , p oil t . We do not report these tests to save space. Furthermore, using likelihood ratio statistics we test whether the coefficients of these cointegrating vectors conform with our ARDL estimations. The likelihood ratio tests for the restrictions imposed on the cointegrating vectors (45)- (47) 
where the b's are the estimates of the ARDL approach. At conventional significance levels, the above tests cannot reject the null that the longrun relationships estimated using the ARDL approach do indeed represent cointegrating vectors. 
Testing for weak invariance
According to the weak invariance hypothesis, the long-run unemployment rate can be a function of the ratios of growing variables. In the context of our empirical model, weak invariance implies that the long-run unemployment depends on the ratio of population to the capital stock. That is, on the righthand side of equation (41) we should have the difference between the log of population and the log of capital stock (Z t À K t ) as an explanatory variable. So weak invariance requires the following restriction on the long-run unemployment equation (41):
Imposing the above null hypothesis on equation (41) gives
It can be seen from equations (38)-(40) that the H K,Z restriction only involves the parameters of the labor demand equation. In particular, weak invariance requires that the long-run elasticity of employment with respect to capital is unity. Using a Wald test, we find that the weak invariance hypothesis is clearly rejected by the data. 25
CONCLUSION
In sum, this paper has argued that the weak and strong invariance restrictions, applied to the labor market, are unnecessary to ensure that the long-run unemployment rate is independent of the capital stock, the labor force and productivity. There is no reason to believe that the labor market alone is responsible for ensuring that unemployment is trendless over the long run. In general, equilibrating mechanisms in the labor market and other markets are jointly responsible for this phenomenon. Thus the invariance restrictions need not be imposed on the specifications of labor market systems (such as the price mark-up and wage mark-up equations above), or on estimations of single-equation unemployment models. Restrictions on the relationships between the long-run growth rates of the capital stock, the labor force and technology are sufficient for this purpose.
We have shown that this result has important implications for prediction and policy. For example, imposing strong invariance restrictions on labor market activity implies that policies that shift upward the time path of the capital stock have no long-run effect on the unemployment rate; but if these 25. The test follows a w 2 (1) distribution, the value of the Wald statistic is 9.46, and the 5 per cent critical value is 3.84.
restrictions are removed, these policies may have a permanent unemployment effect. Along analogous lines, removing such restrictions also implies that policies affecting labor force participation may influence the long-run unemployment rate as well.
APPENDIX A APPENDIX B
By (12), (13) and (16), we find that the change in steady-state unemployment is
The first term on the right-hand side of the above equation measures the effect that a change in a Z , da Z , has on the steady-state unemployment via the level of population; the second term describes how a Z influences [1] DE t 5 2.87 À 0.31E t À 2 À 0.10w t þ 0.15K t (1.22) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) þ 3.13DK t À 2.02DK t À 1 À 0.54TR t À 0.01 p oil t R 2 5 0.89 (0.46) (0.40) (0.15) (0.002) [2] Dw t 5 À 0.34 À 0.29w t À 2 þ 0.15b t À 0.45u t À 1.15DTR t R 2 5 0.50 (0.11) (0.08) (0.04) (0.14) (0.37) [3] DL t 5 À 0.003 þ 0.38DL t À 1 À 0.25L t À 2 À 0.15Du t þ 0.02w t , þ 0.25Z t R 2 5 0.57 (0.02) (0.13) (0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (* ) * The restriction that the long-run elasticity of population is unity (coef. of Z t 5 À coef. of L t À 2 ) cannot be rejected at the 5 per cent size of the test. Standard errors in parentheses. 
